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Abstract
We study the effects of mobility on the evolution of cooperation among
mobile players, which imitate collective motion of biological flocks and
interact with neighbors within a prescribed radius R. Adopting the pris-
oner’s dilemma game and the snowdrift game as metaphors, we find that
cooperation can be maintained and even enhanced for low velocities and
small payoff parameters, when compared with the case that all agents do
not move. But such enhancement of cooperation is largely determined by
the value of R, and for modest values of R, there is an optimal value of
velocity to induce the maximum cooperation level. Besides, we find that
intermediate values of R or initial population densities are most favorable
for cooperation, when the velocity is fixed. Depending on the payoff pa-
rameters, the system can reach an absorbing state of cooperation when
the snowdrift game is played. Our findings may help understanding the
relations between individual mobility and cooperative behavior in social
systems.
Keywords: cooperation, flocks, evolutionary games, prisoner’s dilemma,
snowdrift game, mobility
1 Introduction
Cooperation is commonly observed throughout biological systems, animal king-
doms and human societies. But from a Darwinian viewpoint, cooperators are at
a disadvantage in natural selection, because they increase the fitness of others
at the cost of their own survival and reproduction [1]. In a broad range of disci-
plines, understanding the emergence of cooperation is a fundamental problem,
which is often studied within the framework of evolutionary game theory.
The prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game and the snowdrift game are commonly
used two person games with two strategies, cooperation (C) and defection (D).
Mutual cooperation pays each a reward R, while mutual defection brings each a
punishment P . When one defector meets one cooperator, the former gains the
temptation T while the latter obtains the sucker’s payoff S. The PD is defined
by the payoffs, if T > R > P > S and 2R > S+T . In a single round of the PD,
though the individual interest can be maximized by defection, the collective
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payoff achieves the maximum only when both players cooperate. Hence the
dilemma arises. As an alternative model to study cooperative behavior, the SD
is produced when T > R > S > P . In contrast with the PD, the best strategy
of the SD depends on the co-player: to defect if the opponent cooperates, but
to cooperate if the opponent defects. Under replicator dynamics in well-mixed
populations, defection is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in the PD, while
cooperators may coexist with defectors in the SD. Note in the SD, the average
population payoff at evolutionary equilibrium is smaller than that when everyone
plays C [2]. Thus SD is still a social dilemma.
One of possible mechanisms accounting for the establishment of coopera-
tion is the so-called network reciprocity [3]. Discarding the well-mixed assump-
tion for populations, this theory focuses on how spatial structure affects the
evolution of cooperation. Axelrod first suggested to locate individuals on the
two-dimensional array, where interactions only happened within local neighbor-
hoods. Nowak and May developed this idea later, showing that unconditional
cooperators could survive by forming clusters [4]. These pioneering studies
have triggered an intensive investigation of spatial games, yielding enormous
combinations of evolutionary rules, graphs and game models. In Ref. [5], the
effect of noise is incorporated in the strategy adoption, and Darwinian selec-
tion of the noise level favors a specific parameter value that induces the highest
level of cooperation [6, 7]. Diversity is another role facilitating cooperation,
which takes various forms as heterogeneous graphs [8], preferential imitations
[9], reproduction probabilities [10], individual rationality [11], fitness [12] or be-
havioral preferences [13]. Since connectivity structures in the real world are far
more than regular lattices, there are many interests in the impact of complex
topologies on cooperative behavior [14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. The co-evolution
of strategies and individual traits, such as teaching activities [20, 21], learning
rules [22, 23] and social ties [24, 25, 26, 27, 28], constitutes a key mechanism for
the sustainability of cooperation. Interestingly, cooperators can benefit from
the continuous supply of new players [29, 30], and the strategy-independent
evolution of networks can evoke powerful mechanisms to promote cooperation
[31, 32]. More details about spatial evolutionary games can be found in Ref.
[2, 3, 33, 34] and references therein.
Mobility of individuals is responsible for various spatiotemporal dynamics on
geographical scales, such as the spread of infectious diseases and wireless viruses
[35]. And statistical properties of human motion have attracted much interest
in recent years [36, 37, 38]. Indeed, the motion of individuals is an important
characteristic of social networks [39]. Though it is often neglected, the effects of
mobility on the evolution of cooperation vary with movement forms and pop-
ulation structures. Vainstein et al. [40] considered a random diffusive process
in a population of agents with pure strategies, where each agent can jump to a
nearest empty site with a certain probability. It was found that cooperation can
be enhanced by the movement of players, provided that the mobility parameter
is kept with a certain range. The weak form of the PD adopted in Ref. [40] was
later extended to other games [41, 42],and it was found that cooperation in the
SD is not so often inhibited as that reported in Ref. [43]. Besides, the movement
of players may take an adaptive form for payoffs or neighbors, and contingent
mobility is often expected to enhance cooperation. Aktipis [44] proposed a walk-
away strategy to avoid repeated interactions with defectors, which outperforms
complex strategies under a number of conditions. Helbing and Yu introduced
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the success-driven migration, in which players determine destinations through
fictitious play [45]. Besides, individuals can decide when to move based on the
number of neighboring defectors [46].
The synchronised motion of animal groups, such as fish schools and bird
flocks, is an intriguing phenomenon, which can be modeled by systems of self-
driven agents [47, 48, 49]. Recently, the model by Vicsek et al. has gained
much attention for minimalism styles and rich dynamics [47]. Here we combine
the Vicsek model with evolutionary games, focusing on the effect of mobility
on the evolution of cooperation. We reserve well-known elements like direction
alignment and circular neighborhoods, ignoring the influence of angular noise
on the update of velocity. We also cancel the periodic boundary conditions for
simplicity, which can strongly affect the system behavior at the large velocity
regime [48]. Thus when players move, the system is split into some discon-
nected groups, within which agents move toward the same direction. Note in
some social systems, individuals do divide into groups according to race, wealth,
age, and so on. We think that the aggregation of individuals partly reflects the
community structure in social networks. In Ref. [50], we have investigated an
evolutionary PD game in a Vicsek-like model, where each agent plays with con-
stant number of neighbors. We have found that cooperation can be maintained
and even enhanced by the motion of players, provided that certain conditions are
fulfilled. In the current work, we will check the robustness of our conclusions,
when each agent plays the PD game with those individuals within a certain
distance. Besides, we will study how mobility affects the outcome of the SD
game.
2 The Model
We consider a system with N autonomous agents, which have positions xi(t)
and move synchronously with velocities
−→
Vi(t) in a two-dimensional plane. The
velocity
−→
Vi(t) of the agent i is characterized by a fixed absolute velocity v and
an angle θi(t) indicating the direction of motion. When t = 0, all agents are
randomly distributed in an L×L square without boundary restrictions. Rather
than fixed within a periodic domain, individuals can cross the border of the
square when t > 0, and move in the whole plane. The square only represents
the initial distribution of individuals with a density ρ = N/L2. Besides, initial
moving directions of agents, θi(0), are uniformly distributed in the interval
[0, 2pi). At each time step, the ith agent updates its position according to
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) +
−→
Vi(t)∆t. (1)
Here ∆t is set to 1 between two updates on the positions.
To simulate the process of direction alignment in flocks, the angle θi(t) of
the agent i is updated according to the average direction of nearby neighbors
[47]. Then we have
θi(t+ 1) = arctan
sinθi(t) +
∑
j∈Wi(t)
sinθj(t)
cosθi(t) +
∑
j∈Wi(t)
cosθj(t)
, (2)
where Wi(t) denotes the neighbors set of the agent i at time t. Here Wi(t) is
defined as agents in the spherical neighborhood of the radius R centered on the
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agent i,
Wi(t) = {j| | xj − xi |< R, j ∈ N, j 6= i}, (3)
where | • | denotes the Euclidean distance between j and i in two-dimensional
space. And we assume that each agent has the same radius.
The equations given above characterize the motion of agents. When moving
in the plane, the agents also play games in pairs. For the PD, we take a re-scaled
form suggested by Nowak et al. [4] as
A =
(
1 0
b 0
)
, (4)
where b denotes the temptation to defect, and 1 < b < 2. And for the SD, we
take a simplified form as
A =
(
1 1− r
1 + r 0
)
, (5)
where r denotes the cost-to-benefit ratio of mutual cooperation, and 0 < r < 1.
The strategy si of the agent i, cooperation or defection, can be denoted by a
unit vector (1, 0)T or (0, 1)T respectively. During the evolution of strategies,
an normalized payoff is calculated to exclude the effect coming from different
degrees of players,
Pi =
∑
j∈Wi(t)
sTi Asj
|Wi(t) |
, (6)
where | • | represents the size of Wi(t), and A is the payoff matrix. Afterward,
every agent compares its income with that of its neighbors, following the strategy
which owns the highest payoff among its neighbors and itself [4].
The system begins with an equal percentage of cooperators and defectors.
At each step, all agents collect payoffs and update strategies, and next, they
modify positions and directions. The time scale that characterizes the evolution
of strategies is the same as the time scale that represents the motion of players.
This process is repeated until the system reaches equilibrium.
Fig. 1(a) illustrates the segregation of players at equilibrium. And players
in the same group can move coherently, as shown in Fig. 1(b). During the
process of direction alignment, the movement of players may lead to time-variant
neighborhoods. The total number of new neighbors appearing at time t can be
calculated as
n(t) =
N∑
i=1
|Wi(t)−Wi(t)
⋂
Wi(t− 1)|, (7)
where | • | represents the set size. Fig. 1(c) shows typical evolution of n(t),
which is divided by N for normalization. Besides, we also plot the evolution
of the cooperator frequency fc and the average normalized velocity Va [47] for
comparison. When t > 500, one can see that n(t) decreases to 0, and Va reaches
a steady value. These findings imply that a static interaction network has been
constructed with fixed neighborhoods and velocities of players. When t > 1000,
fc fluctuates stably. Then, the equilibrium frequency of cooperators can be
obtained by averaging over a long period.
Simulations are carried out in a system with N = 1000, L = 10. To ensure
fixed topology of the interaction network, the evolution of n(t) is monitored
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Fig. 1. (a)Snapshots of equilibrium configurations in the PD (b = 1.25, R =
0.5 and v = 0.05).The trajectory of the center of each group is denoted by an
arrow, which also indicates the group composition (solid arrow, all C; dotted
arrow, all D; dashed arrow, coexistence of C and D). And the area of each circle
is proportional to the group size. (b)Magnification of the labeled group (solid
arrow, cooperator; dotted arrow, defector). (c)Representative time evolutions
of fc, n(t)/N and Va for the PD (b = 1.25, R = 0.5 and v = 0.05). The data
are obtained in one realization.
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after a suitable relaxation time, which is varied from 5000 to 105 time steps
and dependent on the values of R, v and L. If n(t) ≤ 1, and this condition
can hold for q = 1000 time steps, the network will be treated as a static one.
Then the equilibrium frequency of cooperators is evaluated by averaging over
the last 1000 generations. All data points shown in each figure are acquired by
averaging over 200 realizations of independent initial states.
3 Results and Discussions
Fig. 2 shows the fraction of cooperators fc as a function of the payoff parameter,
b for the PD and r for the SD, under different values of v when R is fixed. Clearly,
the cooperation level decreases with b and r in both games, no matter what v
is. Compared with the static case (v = 0), it is worth noting that cooperation
is greatly enhanced in a large region of b (r), when players are allowed to move
with a low velocity (for example, v = 0.01). As shown in Fig. 2, the proportion
of cooperators for v > 0 is higher than that for v = 0,when b < 1.17 or r < 0.6,
and fc can even approach 1 in the SD. But such an enhancement of cooperation
can only be observed for small values of b (r), as the velocity increases from 0.01
to 0.15. Indeed, a rapid decrease of the cooperator frequency can be observed
in both games when v = 0.15.
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Fig. 2. The cooperator frequency fc versus the payoff parameters b (PD) and
r (SD) for different values of v.
To clarify the effects of v on the cooperator frequency, Fig. 3 presents the
dependence of the cooperation level fc on the absolute velocity v for different
values of R. It displays that the fraction of cooperators for v = 10−6 is very
close to that for v = 0, irrespective of the value of R. Meanwhile, it can be
found that whether the movement of players promotes cooperation is largely
determined by the value of R. As shown in Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(d), the
movement of players fails to promote cooperation for small R. One can see that
the maximum of fc for R = 0.1 appears at v = 10−6 in both games, and the
cooperation level is lower than that for v = 0 over the entire range of v. For
large R, the enhancement of cooperation resulting from the movement of players
is quite limited or even disappeared. As illustrated in Fig. 3(c) and Fig. 3(f),
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when v ≤ 10−2, the curve of fc nearly coincides with the result for v = 0 in the
PD, and only a tiny increase of fc can be observed in the SD. When R = 0.4,
however, the introduction of mobility can significantly improve cooperation in
both games. As shown in Fig. 3(b) and Fig. 3(e), the cooperator frequency
for v > 0 is higher than that for v = 0 in the whole region of v, and there is a
maximum of fc at v = 10−2. The resonance-like phenomenon also implies that
for a fixed b (r), decreasing the value of v cannot always promote cooperation.
Before moving forward, we would like to add some remarks about the above
result. Previous work has shown that cooperation is not only possible but may
even be enhanced by the non-contingent movement of players when compared
with the static case [40, 51, 52, 53]. And our result provides another example
that helps understand the universal role of mobility in the evolution of cooper-
ation. Particularly, Meloni and his colleagues [52] investigated how cooperation
emerges in a population of PD players, which move in a square plane with
periodic boundary conditions. The final outcome of the system has only two
possibilities, all-C or all-D, when the neighborhood of each player is defined by a
fixed radius R. The authors claimed that the movement of players can promote
cooperation when the temptation to defect and the velocity of players are small,
and the probability of achieving an all-C state monotonically decreases with the
velocity for a fixed payoff parameter. In our model, however, the maximum co-
operation level does not occur at the limit v → 0, when the movement of players
promotes cooperation for modest values of R, and a non-monotonic dependence
of the cooperator frequency on the velocity of players can be observed in Fig.
3(b) and Fig. 3(e). Compared with the result in Ref. [52], this phenomenon can
be explained by the difference between the rules of movement. In Ref. [52], the
network of contacts is continuously changing, because individual directions are
controlled by N-independent random variables. As a result, randomness among
partnerships can be preserved all the time. But in the present work, a static
network of interactions is gradually developed, when individuals successfully
align themselves with neighbors. Such fixed partnerships are maintained by the
cancellation of periodic boundary conditions, which allows the coexistence of
cooperators and defectors. As shown in Fig. 1(c), the range of alignment inter-
action fluctuates only when t < 500, while the variance of neighbors causes a
sharp transition of the cooperator frequency. In the process of direction align-
ment, the larger the value of v, the higher the probability for each individual
to encounter different neighbors. Different with the work in Ref. [52], the value
of v also determines how long random partnerships persist. In our work, for a
fixed R, the larger the value of v, the sooner the system is expected to achieve
static neighborhoods. It is not easy to describe how cooperation is promoted by
small values of v, and a heuristic explanation is that a low degree of migration
can trigger the expansion of cooperator clusters, as suggested in Ref. [53]. In
our model, the cooperation level for v = 10−6 is near to that for v = 0. And
for large values of v, cooperative clusters may be destroyed by the movement
of players, making cooperators vulnerable to defectors. Thus similar to the so
called evolutionary coherence resonance [54, 55], the maximum level of coopera-
tion can be induced by an optimal amount of randomness, which is determined
by the absolute velocity v of players. In addition, results in Fig. 3 have also
shown that the movement of players can inhibit cooperation for a small (large)
value of R. Next, we will make discussions about the role of R in the evolution
of cooperation.
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Fig. 3. The frequency of cooperators fc is plotted against the absolute velocity
v for different values of R, while the corresponding value of fc for v = 0 is
presented by a dashed horizontal line in each figure. The temptation b is set to
1.15 (PD), and the cost-to-benefit ratio r is set to 0.6 (SD). A logarithmic scale
is used for the X axis.
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In Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b), we show that the cooperator frequency fc varies
with the radius R for different values of v. It displays that the proportion of
cooperators monotonously decreases with R, until the radius exceeds a certain
value, and for R < 0.2, the maximum of fc appears at v = 0. Note in the current
work, interaction neighborhoods are determined by the radius R at each time
step. For near-zero values of R, there are few links among individuals in the
instant network. As pairwise interactions increase with R, it is hard for isolated
cooperators to resist the invasion of defectors. When players are allowed to
move, defectors have more chances to exploit cooperators. Then for small R,
defection becomes dominant in the population, and the movement of players
inhibits the evolution of cooperation. But for larger values of R, cooperators
are expected to get together, and the introduction of mobility causes a more
rapid increase of fc. As shown in Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b), the curves of fc for
v > 0 depart around R = 0.09, and then begin increasing with R in both games.
For each value of v, the increase of R induces a resonance-like phenomena, and
the cooperator frequency fc reaches a maximum around R = 0.6. This finding
indicates that intermediate values of R are most favorable for cooperation, since
the system approaches a fully connected network for extremely large R in the
stationary state. It also helps explain why the movement of players fails to
give evident enhancement to the cooperation level at large values of R. Indeed,
for large R, the network of interactions is almost static, since individuals can
quickly align themselves with neighbors. As a result, though the maximum of
fc decreases with v, the curves of fc for different values of v gradually merge
at large values of R. In Fig. 4(c) and Fig. 4(d), we show the dependence of the
cooperation level on the radius R for different values of b (r). It displays that
the resonance-like phenomena is greatly influenced by the payoff parameter,
and for a fixed R, the maximum of fc decreases with b (r). For large b (r), the
cooperator frequency fc monotonously decreases with R, and the maximum
level of cooperation appears at the limit R → 0. But for r = 0.2, the system
can reach an absorbing state of all cooperators. This is because the SD is more
favorable for cooperators than the PD.
In Fig. 5, we plot the cooperator frequency fc against the initial density ρ
for fixed payoff parameters when R = 0.5, v = 0.05. One can see that the be-
havior of fc caused by the variance of ρ is similar to that shown in Fig. 4. This
is because both R and ρ can influence the size of neighborhood. For instance,
when t = 0, the average degree of the interaction network can be written as
< k >= NR2pi/L2 = ρR2pi. When the players are located on the vertices of a
fixed network, previous results have shown the resonant behavior of the cooper-
ator frequency around certain values of the average degree [56]. And our work
can be viewed as an extension to the dynamic interaction network that appears
during the movement of players. For small ρ, all agents are widely dispersed in
the plane, and cooperators cannot get enough support from cooperative neigh-
bors. Though the chance of forming cooperative clusters increases with ρ, the
proportion of cooperators monotonously decreases until ρ > 0.13, as shown in
the inset of Fig. 5(a). Large values of ρ are also harmful to cooperators. This is
because the mean field situation is nicely recovered for large ρ, in which inter-
actions almost take place among each pair of players. Between these two limits,
one can find that the cooperation level can reach the maximum for moderate
values of ρ. It has been reported that the cooperation level can reach a peak
at some values of ρ, when the players are running in a square with periodic
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Fig. 4. The cooperator frequency fc versus the radius R for different values of
b (PD), r (SD) and v.
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boundary conditions [52]. And our results indicate the importance of the initial
density ρ to the evolution of cooperation, even when the boundary restrictions
are removed. In the SD, one can find the similar phenomenon that observed in
the PD: when r = 0.6, the cooperator frequency fc first decreases for small ρ,
then increases with ρ until reaching the maximum, and decreases for large ρ.
Note when r = 0.2, the cooperator frequency fc monotonously increases with
ρ, and the system can reach an absorbing state of full cooperators at last.
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Fig. 5. The cooperator frequency fc versus the density ρ for R = 0.5, v = 0.05.
A logarithmic scale is used for the X axis.
4 Conclusion
To summarize, we have investigated the PD game and the SD game in a popula-
tion of mobile players, which move at a constant speed v while interacting with
neighbors within a fixed radius R. Through alignment of traveling direction,
individuals develop static interaction neighborhoods during movement. Numer-
ical simulations show that cooperation can be maintained with simple strategies,
provided the payoff parameter and the velocity are small. Compared with the
case for v = 0, cooperation can be enhanced by the movement of players, and
there is an optimal value of v to induce the maximum cooperation level. How-
ever, such enhancement of cooperation can only be observed for modest values
of R. This is because cooperators have less chances to form clusters for small R,
while interaction neighborhoods approach a static, full connected network for
large R. Besides, when v is fixed, our results suggest that intermediate values
of R and initial population densities ρ are most favorable for cooperation, since
both R and ρ can influence the size of neighborhood. The resonance-like phe-
nomenon caused by R and ρ is also affected by the payoff parameter, and for a
small cost-to-benefit ratio, the system can reach an absorbing state of full coop-
erators. Our results may be relevant for understanding the role of information
flows in cooperative, multi-vehicle systems [57].
The work is jointly supported by the National Natural Science Foundation
of China (61004088), the Key Foundation for Basic Research from Science and
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